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Points the City intends to rely on for reversal of judgment Case No. 8122

Page
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1. The court erred in finding that the Plaintiff and
Respondent railroad owned the Easterly part of second
West extending from 53rd to 64th South Streets, that is
the property in question i.e. that East of a point 11 feet
vVest of the center of said tracks.
(a) The public acquired the right to use Second
'Vest Street as a public highway by grant under
43 U.S.C.A. 932 prior to the issuance of patent.
(b) The railroad's right to maintain its line over
the land in question must depend on Deeds from
patentees and the patents and deeds were subject
to existing rights in the public to maintain a highway.
(c) The width of Second South when established
was such width as was reasonably necessary for
public easement.
(d) The public thoroughfare ·once established has
never been abandoned.
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Point 1 (c)
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S'TATE OF UTAH
OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Corporation, and UNION
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a
Corporation,
Plaintiffs,
-vs.MURRAY CITY, a municipal corporation, and STATEWIDE PLUMBING
AND HEATING COMPANY, INC., a
Corporation,
Defendants.

Case No.
8122

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF· FACTS
Both the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company and
Defendant Murray City claim to be the owner of a strip
of land approximately four (4) rods wide running in a
northerly and southerly direction from what is now
known as 5300 South in Murray City to 6400 South at a
point known of as 200 West (R. 3).
Murray City was, in the spring of 1953, engaged in
laying a sewer, one main of which ran the full length of
the above piece of ground which was known of as Second
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We,st Street in Murray. The railroad company claimed
that the City merely had a prescriptive right to the
travelled portion of the land and that this prescriptive
right did not include the right to install a sewer underground. The railroad brought this action to enjoin the
City from installing its sewer upon S.econd West Street
(R.l-7).
The City claimed that the land in question was a public highway and had been such prior to 1871 and that the
railroad merely had an easement down the middle of the
street and the City, by constructing a sewer was not interfering in any way with the railroad's easement (R. 8-12).
The City was also engaged in running sewer lines
along 53rd South Street and 59th South, 61st South and
64th South Streets, and where these streets were crosed
by the railroad track, the railroad maintained that the
City could not install the sewer under its tracks without
its permission. The City maintained that it had jurisdiction to install such sewers under its public highways provided it did not in any way interfere with or damage the
railroad property.
The undisputed evidence is as follows: The railroad
track in question was constructed in the summer of 1871
(R.19). At the tilne it was constructed there were no
deeds or rights of way procured by the railroad over the
area involved in this law suit.
The railroad prepared a map of the area in question
in 1920 which was admitted in evidence as Exhibit D-10.
This map shows there then existed a travelled roadway
2
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along the west side of the railroad tracks. The railroad
offered no evidence as to when travel on Second West
Street commenced, nor any evidence as to the extent of
the use of Second West Street.
Plaintiff produced two· witnesses, J. E. W alhquist
and J. Clifford Hanson, now mayor of Murray. Walhquist lived at 6276 South Second West and now lives at
121 ·vvest 5900 South, which is adjacent to Second West
Street (R. 102). Mr. Hanson has lived on Second West
Street his entire life, part of the time at 6239 and the
balance at 6191 (R. 120). Both men attended the 24th
District School which was located on the east side of Second West Street at approximately 6100 South (R.104,
121). The 24th District School was built in 1874 (R. 1023), and the only means of ingress and egress to said school
was from Second West Street (R. 103-123). Both Walhquist and Hanson testified that according to their earliest
recollections, approximately 1899, that in front of the
24th District School there was travel on both the east and
west sides of the railroad tracks (R. 105-121). The travel
on the east side was fron1 a point approximately two
hundred yards South of the school to a point three to
four hundred yards North of the school; travel on the
east side was abandoned about 1930 (R. 124), when the
railroad tracks were raised and the crossings removed
(R.125).
Mr. Hanson testified that according to his earliest
recollection there were about as many homes on Second
West Street as there are at the present time (R. 122).
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Exhibit A prepared by the Plaintiff for this action shows
the homes abutting upon Second West Street, and it is to
he noted that there are nine (9) homes on the east side of
Second West Street, whose only means of ingress and
egress is by means of Second West Street. Mr. Hansen
remembers ore haulers using Second West Street as
early as 1900 in hauling ores to the old Germania Smelter,
the haulers coming from Big and Little Cottonwood Canyons down 64th South to Second West and then north to
the smelter. A power line of Murray City runs down the
east side of the tracks near the east boundary line of the
street and has been there since 1914-15 (R.126, 178).
The travelled portion west of the tracks has been oil
surfaced, Mr. Hansen says, since 1930 (R.126), and the
railroad's Exhibit P-37 shows that in 1920 this was an
oil mulch road. This map also shows water line down the
west side supplying the houses on both the east and west
sides of the highway, shows Murray City's pole line running down the east side, and also shows houses on both
the east and west sides.
Alton Lund, an attorney at law and registered abstractor, was employed by the City for the purpose of
making a search of the records of Salt Lake County. He
testified that there are very few deeds in the County
Recorder's office prior to 1872 and that the lands over
which the street in question and railroad ran were taken
to patent between 1872 and 1875 (R. 84). He said that
the streets in Salt Lake County, except for those in subdivisions or other City plats are not dedicated (R. 86).
He said, for example, there is no dedication of State
4
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Street (R. 85-88), and that titles to property abutting upon the public highways generally runs to the center of the
street (R. 86). He stated that he searched for deeds conveying property abutting upon Second West between 53rd
and 64th South Streets and found the following deeds
making reference to a street (R. 77) :
Deed from J'ames Randle to Sven M. Lovendahl,
dated June 11, 1875, recorded June 15, 1875 (R. 77); in
the body of the deed the following reference is made to
a road: "thence South on the West line of a county
road," (R. 79).
Another deed found by Lund ran from James Randle
to James Winchester and other trustees of the 24th
School District dated April 7, 1875, which description
contained the following reference to a country road:
"Thence North on the East line of county road and parallel and 50 links east of the center of the U. S. Railroad
track," (R. 80).
Another deed was found from Peter I-Ianson to
Thomas Steffensen dated April 1, 1876, which made the
following reference to a county road: "Thence South
88° 45' East 9 chains and 30 links (to the West line of
county road) thence South along the West line of county
road 5 chains and 78links."
Another deed was found which ran from Peter !-Ianson to Carl F. C. Meyer, dated December 16, 1874, which
made the following reference to the road: "Thence North
322 rods more or less to the center of the county road
(this would refer to 64th South Street) thence on the
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center of said road South 84¥2 o 2302 rods to the East line
of a four rod street thence on the East line of said stre€t,"
(R. 81). The four rod street referred to is Second West
Street.
The City prepared a Plat of Second West Street between 5300 South and 6400 South and the same was introduced in evidence as Exhibit B-12, and on this Plat the
four deeds above referred to are platted showing that
the county road referred to was located at the same
place as Second West Street is at the present time.
In this connection it is to be noted that the deeds
from Peter Hanson to Carl F. C. Meyer are South of
64th South Street and Second West Street does not
at this time extend South of 64th South Street, however,
Plaintiff caused to he introduced in evidence a copy of
the official highway plat of Salt Lake County as Exhibit
P-34; this map having been adopted in 1898 by Salt Lake
County as the official road map (see Exhibit P-34). This
map shows Second West Street, or Route 10 as it was
then known, as extending South of 64th South Stre·et.
Two exhibits which are unmarked are important in this
connection, one being a photostat of the index of highways of Salt Lake County and which shows Highway
10 to be Second West Street, and a photostat of the field
notes of Highway 10, which also shows Highway 10 to be
the same as Second West Street.
The railroad claims ownership under five deeds introduced in evidence as Exhibits P-1, P-2, P-3, P-4, and
6
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1.

P-5; the pertinent information is shown as follows:
Patent To
Andrew Cahoon
Benjamin Wright
James Randle
Peter Hanson
Christian Berger

When
March 3, 1875
December 1, 1874
December 1, 1874
March 5, 1875
July 10, 1872

Deeded to Railroad
December 14, 1874
August 12, 1876
February 14, 1876
April 4, 1876
July 5', 1873

These deeds grant to the railroad the property traversed by the highway and railroad with the exception of
an area of about 758 feet southerly from the North line
of Section 24 (R. 41). As to this particular strip of land,
the railroad was unable to show any title or interest other
than continued user of their tracks.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court found that the
railroad owned all of the land in controversy from the
East fence line to a point 11 feet West of the center line
of the main track of the railroad and found that the City
was the owner of the land vVest of this line to the fence
lines on the \Vest and found that the City was the owner
of a 64 foot street at 64th South Street and a 24 foot
street at 61st South Street, a 50 foot street at 59th South
Street and a 26 foot street at 53rd South Street.
The trial judge visited Second West Street and found
64th South to be 66 feet wide with a traveled portion over
the railroad tracks 64 feet wide. 61st South was found
to be 50 feet wide with a traveled portion over the trackf;
24 feet wide; 59th South is 66 feet wide with a 50 foot
traveled area over the railroad tracks; and 53rd South is
33 feet wide with a 26 foot traveled portion over the
tracks (see Stipulation of Counsel).
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THE POINTS THE CITY INTENDS TO RELY
UPON FOR A REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT
1. The Court erred in finding that the strip of land
approximately four rods in width extending from 53rd
South Street to 64th South Street at a point commonly
known of as 200 West was not a public thoroughfare, it
being contrary to the evidence and erred in finding the
Easterly portion of said four rod strip, to-wit: the portion described in Paragraph 16 of the Findings of Fact
belonged to the Railroad.
(a) The rights of the public to any part of
the four rod strip of land depends upon acceptance
pursuant to 43 U.S.C.A. 932 prior to the issuance
of patent.
(b) 43 U.S.C.A. 932 does not grant to a
railroad the right to acquire a right of way across
the public domain and there is no evidence of any
right in the railroad to construct its line over the
four rod strip in question in 1871, its right depending upon deeds acquired from the patentees
between July 5, 1873 and August 12, 1876 and
the patentees of the land in question and the railroad as grantee took said property subject to the
rights of way acquired by the public prior to the
issuance of patent.
(c) The public thoroughfare established by
the public along Second West Street was of such
width as was reasonably necessary for the public
easement.
8
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(d) The public thoroughfare once established has never been abandoned or vacated.
ARGUMENT
1. (a) When the railroad commenced this action
it seems fair to say that the drafter of the Complaint
intended to rely upon the rights that the railroad obtained pursuant to the five ( 5) deeds introduced in evidence as Exhibits P-1 through P-5 inclusive. These deeds
bear dates between July 5th, 1873 and August 12, 1876.
These deeds covered all of the land in question except
a strip of about 758 feet North and South running Southerly from the North line of Section 24 and Plaintiff's only
claim to this 758 feet would have to depend upon some
kind of prescriptive right. The court, in its Findings of
Fact and particularly in Paragraph 16, apparently found
that
43 U.S.C.A. 932
applied to railroads and gave to the railroad a piece of
land approximately thirty-three (33) feet East of the
center of its tracks while only running eleven (11) feet
West. There is not anything to indicate just how the
court arrived at this lop-sided right of way over the 758
feet in question.
It is the position of the City that the four-rod street
was being used by the public prior to the construction of
the railroad and that the public right to the highway was
acquired pursuant to Section 932, supra.
This court has construed the above section in the
case of

9
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Lindsay Land v. Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 258
Pac. 646, Utah 1929
where the section was construed to be a standing offer by
the Federal Government which could be accepted in any
manner by the public using the land for a highway or
by a public body formally accepting a piece of land for a
highway itself.
Much of the land in Utah was settled upon and reduced to possession many years before any patents were
issued. The first land office to be established in Utah was
in 1869 and no patents were issued prior to that date. The
evidence does not disclose the basis for the issuance of the
patents to the land in question whether by preemption or
homestead. Homestead laws required five (5) years of·
occupancy before issuance of patent and if such is the
basis of the patents to the land in question the street in
question was occupied by the patentees prior to the construction of the railroad in 1871. This being true it can
well be asked, upon what right did the railroad rely when
constructing its tracks~ Having offered no evidence of
such right we submit it must have been constructed down
an established public highway, unless we wish to assume
an illegal act of trespass.
Neither party was able to produce any direct evidence at the trial on which was first the road or the railroad. The following evidence was introduced by the City
which throws some light on the subject. The 24th District
School was built in 1874 (R. 102-3). The railroad had
been constructed at that time and if there was no public
road on the East of the railroad track as found hy the
10
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trial court in this matter, then the trustees of the 24th
District School acquired a piece of property and built a
public school which had no means of ingress and egress.
The evidence is undisputed that from the time the school
was built until it was demolished in 1907, that the only
means of ingress and egress was by way of 2nd West
Street and we think the least that can be said for thi~s
evidence is that the trustees of the 24th District School,
when they bought the tract of land in question, certa.inly
believed that they were acquiring a tract of land which
abutted upon a public highway. In 1875 when James
Randle gave to Sven Lovendahl a deed (R. 77) which
in the body thereof, had a clause which read: "Thence
South on the West line of a County Road." Certainly
James Randle thought that at Second West Street along
which this course of the deed ran, was at that time a
county road or a public thoroughfare. Peter Hanson
would likewise have to believe that Second West Street
was a county road when he gave the deed to Thomas
Stephenson, and also when he gave the deed to Carl F.
C. :Meyer (R. 81). James Randle also gave a deed to
James Winchester with a similar reference to a county
road, the East line of which was East of the center of the
U.S. Railroad tracks (R. 81). Now these uncontradicted
acts of Randle and Hanson, and the trustees of the 24th
District School certainly evidenced a state of mind of
people much closer to the facts than anyone· now living
and, it is respectfully submitted, constitutes the most reliable evidence available that Second West Street had
an East side and a West side and that the railroad track
11
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ran down the center thereof.
The evidence is also undisputed that there are now
nine (9) homes on the East side of Second West Street
(Exhibit A) and their only means of ingress and egress is
by means of Second West Street. About the turn of the
century, there were nine (9) homes on the East side of
Second West Street (R. 12). The owners of these homes
undoubtedly believed at the time they were constructed
that they were building them upon a public highway.
The evidence is silent as to whether these householders
ever had any trouble with the railroad because of their
being on the East side of the road and having, according
to the railroad's contention, to cross its right of way and
tracks to get to the travelled portion of the highway. It
would seem reasonable that if Second vVest Street only
existed along the West side of the railroad tracks that
long before this the railroad and the householders on the
East side would have come to grips over the use made
by the householders of the railroad's right of way. If
the railroad had considered the land East of the tracks
as its own private property, it undoubtedly would have
objected to the City's putting its power line down the
East side of the right of way (R.126, 178).
(b)

Congress enacted:
43 U.S.C.A. 932

in 1866. This Section reads as follows :
"The right of way for the construction of
highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted."
12
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This section has been construed in a number of cases,
the best reasoned one being
Burlington , K. & S. W.R. Co. v. Johnson, 16
Pac. Rep. 125, Kansas 1887
In this case Johnson had made a homestead entry and
was in possession of land when the railroad constructed
a grade and track across a portion of the land occupied
by Johnson as a homesteader. From an award to Johnson for damages the railroad appealed, claiming that the
word "highways" in Section 932, supra, embraced railroads. The court held that the language did not lend
itself to such construction arguing that Congress in 1875
enacted a special Section 43 U.S.C.A. 934 which granted
rights of way upon public lands to railroads and by such
enactment must necessarily have believed that Section
932 did not grant such right. The court disposed of the
matter in the following language :
"The railroad company contends that, because
he holds under a homestead entry, and has not
yet acquired the full legal title, he is entitled to
recover nothing beyond the mere injury done to
the improvements which he had placed on the
land. We cannot agree with this contention. The
claim is based mainly on an act of Congress of
JUly 26, 1866, which declares that "the right of
way for the construction of highways over public
lands not reserved for public uses is hereby
granted." Rev. St. U.S. paragraph 2477. It is
argued that railroads are highways within the
meaning of this provision, and that the plaintiff
took his homestead subject to the right of the railroad to appropriate a right of way over the same
without any compensation for any value of the
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soil or damages otherwise than to his improvements. The term "highways" used in the section
quoted does not, in either its ordinary or strict
sense, include railroads. It is true that in a certain
sense a railroad is a public highway to be constructed and operated according to law and subject to public control. It can only be used, however, in a particular manner, and is not open to
common use for foot passengers, horse passengers,
animals and carriages, as an ordinary highway
may be used. In the usual understanding, a highway is one which is common to all people without
distinction, and which they may travel over on
foot or horseback or in carriages. Thomp. Highw.
1; Ang. Highw. 3. A railroad and a comn1on highway are essentially different in regard to construction control, and use, as well as ownership,
and the distinctions are so well understood that
a mention of them is unnecessary.
"It is a familiar rule of law that in interpreting statutes, words and phases are to be taken
in the ordinary sense and com1non acceptation,
unless it appears from the context of the act that
a different meaning was intended. We discove~
nothing in the provision in question, or in the
subsequent legislation of congress, which indicates
that an unusual meaning was attached to the word,
or that it included railroads. Inste&d of that, we
find that, since the law in question was enacted,
congress ·has deen1ed it necessary, by both general
and special acts, to grant right of way to railroads
over the public domain. Aside from several special acts, a general one was passed on March 3,
1875, granting to any railroad the right of way
through any public lands of the United States. It
provided at length the conditions to be observed,
and the steps that were to be taken in order to
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secure the benefit of the act. No reference is there
made to the act of 1866; but congress, as well as
those who were instrumental in obtaining the
legislation, seem to have proceeded upon the
theory that the act of 1866 did not grant a right
of way for railroads. 18 St. at Large, 482. On
March 3, 1873, another act was passed by congress, which indicates to sorne extent the legislative understanding of the act of 1866. It was
then provided that a settler on the public lands,
either by virtue of the pre-emption or homestead
law, shall have the right to transfer, by warranty
against his own acts, any portion of his preemption or homestead for the right of way of
railroads across such pre-emption or homestead.
Rev. St. U. S. Section 2288. Neither of these
enactments purports to modify or repeal the act
of 1866. It was wholly unnecessary for congress
to grant a right of way to railroads, or to provide
that a settler may convey his interest in a preemption or homestead for such purpose, if the act
of 1866, already in force, embraced railroads within its intent. It is true that the case to which we
are referred, (Railway v. Gordon, 41 Mich. 420,
2 N.W. Rep 648) holds that railroads are highways
within the n1eaning of the act of 1866. The court
in that opinion concedes that when the term "highways" is used in legislation, the common highways
of the country are generally to be understood.
The construction that railroads were intended was
based on the apparent liberal policy pursued by
congress in encouraging railroads to build through
the new and unsettled portions of the country.
'fhe court, however, expressed doubt in regard to
theconclusion which it reaehPd, and it does appear
that its attention was called to the subsequent
general legislation of congress expressly granting
a right of way to railroads. An examination of the
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congressional legislature on the subject, and having in mind the rule of interpretation that the.
usual meaning is to be given to words in the
statute, unless another is obviously intended, we
have come to the conclusion that only the common
highways of the country were intended to be included in the term used in the act of 1866."
The court's finding in paragraph 16 of the Findings
of Fact must necessarily depend upon construing Section
932, supra, as applying to railroads. It is respectfully
submitted that in spite of the conflict in the authority
that the reasoning in the Johnson case, supra, is persuasive and that Section 932 does not grant rights of
way over the public domain to railroads. Hence, the right
the railroad acquired to 2nd West Street must, per force,
have been by possession. The City concedes that the
railroad has, at this time, a right to maintain
its railroad down the middle of 2nd West Street but that
such right is subject to the prior right of the public to
the use of a four rod street as a public thoroughfare.
Between 1871 and 1874 such uses as the railroad was making of 2nd West Street had not developed into a prescriptive right and furthern10re the right of the
railroad would be to that part of the street actually
used, to-wit eleven (11) feet West of the center line of the
tracks and the eleven (11) feet East of the tracks, or a
total distance of twenty one (21) feet.
1.. (C) The public thoroughfare established by the
public along Second West Street was of such width as
was reasonably necessary for the public easement.
This court, in the case of
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Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 100 Utah 116 Pac. 2nd
420, utah 1941
affirmed the case of
Whitesides v. Green, 13 Utah 341, 44 P. 1032,
Utah 1896
which held that the right acquired by the public by prescriptive use is subject to different rules than a private
prescriptive use. In the Whitesides case, the Court said:
"The right acquired by prescriptive use carried with it such width as is reasonably necessary
for the public easement of travel."
The original rights of the public acquired for Second
West Street by its prescriptive use against the Federal
Government with its consent under Section 932, supra,
was for a street of reasonable width and Peter Hanson's
deed to Carl F. C. Meyer (R. 81) referred to Second
West Street as a four rod street. Most of the pioneer
streets in Salt Lake County were four rod streets. There
is no evidence that there was ever a four-rod street on
either the East or West side of the railroad tracks ; but
there is now, and has for many years been, a four-rod
street with the railroad tracks running down the center
of it. There is evidence of use by the public of the East
side of the tracks and the power lines of Murray City
are east of the tracks, supra, and a travelled area some
five to six hundred yards long on the East side in front
of the 24th District School was used for many years and
never abandoned ( R. 124).
It seems reasonable to say that a four-rod street
would be a reasonable width for a highway obtained by
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public use under Section 932, supra, and if the use had
established the highway before the railroad was constructed, it seems reasonable and logical that the travelled
way would be forced to the East or West side of the
tracks by the establishment of the railroad which is
apparently what happened. The householders and abutting property owners on either the East or West side
still abutted upon a public thoroughfare and did not, by
the construction of the railroad, become land-locked citizens.
(d) The public right to use Second "\Vest Street is
the same today as when it was originally acquired.
Section 27-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which
reads as follows :
"All highways once established must continue
to be highways until abandoned by order of the
County Commissioners of the County in which
they are situated, or other competent authority."
It is respectfully submitted that there is no evidence
of any abandonment of Second West Street or any part
of it by the County Commissioners of Salt Lake County,
the City Commission of Murray City or any other
competent authority.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully sub1nitted that the evidence in the
foregoing case discloses that there was a public thoroughfare over Second West Street between 53rd and 64th
South Streets, located prior to 1874: and the reasonable
intervretation of the evidence would indicate it was
est::tblished some five (5) years or more before that date,
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and that the public acquired said right by user under
and pursuant to 43 U.S.C.A. 932, which right has never
been abandoned or lost to the public and that the evidence
shows that the reasonable width of the county road thus
established was four rods, and was so considered by the
abutting property owners and that it remains and still is
a four rod public road, subject now to the jurisdiction
of Murray City in which it is presently located. There
is no evidence of abandonment.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Judgment should provide that a four rod City street so
exists, subject to a twenty two (22) foot easement through
the middle of said street, belonging to the railroad,
acquired by adverse use, which easement is now owned
by Plaintiffs.
Respectfully submitted,
D. HOWE MOFFAT
of FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MoFFAT
AND MABEY

WENDELL E. DAY,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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